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most exciting, startling and perceptive critics of visual images don't in the end
depend entirely on their sound methodology, I think. They also depend on the
pleasure, thrill, fascination, wonder, fear or revulsion of the person looking at the
images and then writing about them. Successful interpretation depends on a pas­
sionate engagement with what you see. Use your methodology to discipline your
passion, not to deaden it.

1 researching visual materials
towards a critical visual methodology

Choosing a research methodology means developing a research question and
the tools to generate evidence for its answer; both of these should be consist­
tent with a theoretical framework. This chapter explores recent debates about
the visual to help you develop that framework. To do that, it:

- discusses a range of literature which explores the importance of the visual
to contemporary Western societies;
- offers a broad analytical framework for understanding how images have
social effects;
- suggests some criteria for a critical approach to visual materials;
- and sets up the approach to discussing methods that the rest of this book
relies on.

1 an introductory survey of ‘the visual’

Beginning in the 1970s, and over the following three decades, the social sci­
ences experienced a significant change in their understanding of social life.
This change is often described as the ‘cultural turn’. That is, ‘culture’ became
a crucial means by which many social scientists understood social processes,
social identities, and social change and conflict. Culture is a complex concept,
but, in very broad terms, the result of its deployment has been that social sci­
etists are now very often interested in the ways in which social life is con­
structed through the ideas that people have about it, and the practices that
flow from those ideas. To quote one of the major contributors to this shift,
Stuart Hall:

Culture, it is argued, is not so much a set of things – novels and paintings
or TV programmes or comics – as a process, a set of practices. Primarily,
culture is concerned with the production and exchange of meanings – the
‘giving and taking of meaning’ – between the members of a society or group
Those meanings may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, they may be felt as truth or as fantasy, science or commonsense; and they may be conveyed through everyday speech, elaborate rhetoric, high art, television soap operas, dreams, movies or muzak; and different groups in a society will make sense of the world in different ways. Whatever form they take, these made meanings, or representations, structure the way people behave – the way you and I behave – in our everyday lives.

This sort of argument can take very diverse forms. But more recently, many writers addressing these issues argued that the visual is central to the cultural construction of social life in contemporary Western societies. We are, of course, surrounded by different sorts of visual technologies – photography, film, video, digital graphics, television, acrylcs, for example – and the images they show us – TV programmes, advertisements, snapshots, public sculpture, movies, surveillance video footage, newspaper pictures, paintings. All these different sorts of technologies and images offer views of the world; they render the world in visual terms. But this rendering, even by photographs, is never innocent. These images are never transparent windows onto the world. They interpret the world; they display it in very particular ways. Thus a distinction is sometimes made between vision and visuality. Vision is what the human eye is physiologically capable of seeing (although it must be noted that ideas about that capability have changed historically and will most likely continue to change: see Crary 1992). Visuality, on the other hand, refers to the way in which vision is constructed in various ways: ‘how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein’ (Foster 1988: ix). Another phrase with very similar connotations to visuality is scopic regime. Both terms refer to the ways in which both what is seen and how it is seen are culturally constructed.

For some writers, the visual is the most fundamental of all senses. Gordon Fyfe and John Law (1988: 2), for example, claim that ‘depiction, picturing and seeing are ubiquitous features of the process by which most human beings come to know the world as it really is for them’, and John Berger (1972: 7) suggests that this is because ‘seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak.’ (Clearly these writers pay little attention to those who are born blind.) Other writers, however, prefer to historicize the importance of the visual, tracing what they see as the increasing saturation of Western societies by visual images. Many claim that this process has reached unprecedented levels, so that Westerners now interact with the world mainly through how we see it. Martin Jay (1993) has used the term ocularcentrism to describe the apparent centrality of the visual to contemporary Western life.

This narrative of the increasing importance of the visual to contemporary Western societies is part of a wider analysis of the shift from premodernity to modernity, and from modernity to postmodernity (for example, see Mirzoeff 1999: 1-33). It is often suggested – or assumed – that in premodern societies, visual images were not especially important, partly because there were so few of them in circulation. This began to change with the onset of modernity. In particular, it is suggested that modern forms of understanding the world depend on a scopic regime that equates seeing with knowledge. Chris Jenks (1995), for example, makes this case in an essay entitled ‘The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture’, arguing that ‘looking, seeing and knowing have become perilously intertwined’ so that ‘the modern world is very much a “seen” phenomenon’ (Jenks 1995: 1, 2).

We daily experience and perpetuate the confusion of the “seen” with the “known” in conversation through the commonplace linguistic appellation of “do you see” or “see what I mean?” to utterances that seem to require confirmation, or, when seeking opinion, by inquiring after people’s “views.” (Jenks 1995: 3)

Barbara Maria Stafford (1991), a historian of images used in the sciences, has argued that, in a process beginning in the eighteenth century, the construction of scientific knowledges about the world has become more and more based on images rather than on written texts; Jenks (1995) suggests that it is the valorization of science in Western cultures that has allowed everyday understandings to make the same connection between seeing and knowing. However, that connection was also made in other fields of modern practice. Richard Rorty (1980), for example, traces the development of this conflation of seeing with knowing to the intersection of several ideas central to eighteenth century philosophy. Judith Adler (1989) examines tourism and argues that, between 1600 and 1800, the travel of European elites was defined increasingly as a visual practice, based first on an overarching scientific ideology that cast even the most humble tourists as part of “... the impartial survey of all creation” (Adler 1989: 24), and later on a particular appreciation of spectacular visual and artistic beauty. John Urry (1990) has sketched the outline of a rather different ‘tourist gaze’ which he argues is typical of the mass tourism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see also Pratt 1992). Other writers have made other arguments for the importance of the visual to modern societies. The work of Michel Foucault explores the way in which many nineteenth century institutions depended on various forms of surveillance (1977) (Chapters 7 and 8 here examine the methodological implications of his work); and in his study of nineteenth century world fairs and exhibitions, Timothy Mitchell (1988) shows how European societies represented the whole world as an exhibition. Deborah Poole (1997) has traced how visions of that modernity were thoroughly racialized in the same period. In
the twentieth century, Guy Debord (1977) claims that the world has turned into a 'society of the spectacle', and Paul Virilio (1994) argues that new visualizing technologies have created 'the vision machine' in which we are all caught. The use of the term 'visual culture' refers to the plethora of ways in which the visual is part of social life.

Thus it has been argued that modernity is ocularcentric. It is argued too that the visual is equally central to postmodernity; Nicholas Mirzoeff (1998: 4), for example, has proclaimed that 'the postmodern is a visual culture'. However, in postmodernity, it is suggested, the modern relation between seeing and true knowing has been broken. Thus Mirzoeff (1998) suggests that postmodernity is ocularcentric not simply because visual images are more and more common, nor because knowledges about the world are increasingly articulated visually, but because we interact more and more with totally constructed visual experiences. Thus the modern connection between seeing and knowledge is stretched to breaking point in postmodernity:

Seeing is a great deal more than believing these days. You can buy an image of your house taken from an orbiting satellite or have your internal organs magnetically imaged. If that special moment didn't come quite right in your photography, you can digitally manipulate it on your computer. At New York's Empire State Building, the queues are longer for the virtual reality New York Ride than for the lifts to the observation platforms. Alternatively, you could save yourself the trouble by catching the entire New York skyline, rendered in attractive pastel colours, at the New York, New York resort in Las Vegas. This virtual city will shortly be joined by Paris Las Vegas, imitating the already carefully manipulated image of the city of light. (Mirzoeff 1998: 1)

This is what Jean Baudrillard (1988) some time ago dubbed the simulacrum. Baudrillard argued that in postmodernity, it is no longer possible to make a distinction between the real and the unreal; images have become detached from any certain relation to a real world with the result that we now live in a scopic regime dominated by simulations, or simulacra.

This story about the increasing extent and changing nature of visual culture in modernity and postmodernity is not without its critics, however (see, for example, the debates in the journal October [1996] and the Journal of Visual Culture [2001; 2003]). Two points of debate, for example, are the history and geography of this account. Jeffrey Hamburger (1997), to take just one example, argues that visual images were central to certain kinds of premodern, medieval spirituality, and Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1998) have argued forcefully against the Eurocentrism that pervades many discussions of 'the visual'. The work of Hamburger (1997) and Shohat and Stam (1998), among others, makes it clear that if a narrative of increasing ocularcentrism in the West can be told, it must be much more nuanced, historically and geographically, than has so far been the case (see also Brennan and Jay 1996; Cheetham et al. 2005; Pinney 2003).

There are also debates about the social relations within which these visualities are embedded, and particularly about the effects of simulacra. Baudrillard, for example, has often been accused of uncritically celebrating the simulacrum without regard for the often very unequal social relations that can be articulated through it, and the work of Donna Haraway (1991) is taken by many as a salutary reminder of what is at stake in contemporary ocularcentrism (see also Sturken and Cartwright 2001; Lister and Wells 2001). Like many others, Haraway (1991) notes the contemporary proliferation of visualizing technologies in scientific and everyday use, and she characterizes the scopic regime associated with these technologies thus: 'vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice' (Haraway 1991: 189). Haraway is concerned to specify the social power relations that are articulated through this particular form of visuality, however. She argues that contemporary, unregulated visual gluttony is available to only a few people and institutions, in particular those that are part of the 'history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy' (Haraway 1991: 188). She argues that what this visuality does is to produce specific visions of social difference - of hierarchies of class, 'race', gender, sexuality and so on - while itself claiming not to be part of that hierarchy and thus to be universal. It is because this ordering of difference depends on a distinction between those who claim to see with universal relevance, and those who are seen and categorized in particular ways, that Haraway claims it is intimately related to the oppressions and tyrannies of capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy and so on. Part of Haraway's critical project, then, is to examine in detail how certain institutions mobilize certain forms of visuality to see, and to order, the world. This dominant visuality denies the validity of other ways of visualizing social difference, but Haraway insists that there are indeed other ways of seeing the world, and she is especially interested in efforts to see social difference in non-hierarchical ways. For Haraway, as for many other writers, then, the dominant scopic regime of (post)modernity is neither a historical inevitability, nor is it uncontested. There are different ways of seeing the world, and the critical task is to differentiate between the social effects of those different visions.

The particular forms of representation produced by specific scopic regimes are important to understand, then, because they are intimately bound into social power relations. Although we will later hear some misgivings about some of the results of this sort of argument (see section 4.2 in this chapter), Haraway's (1991) argument makes clear the necessity of understanding what social relations produce, and are reproduced by, what forms of visuality, and the next section explores this argument more fully.
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that there is a dispersed but persistent body of work in the social sciences that uses various kinds of images as ways of answering research questions (questions which may not be directly concerned with visuality or visual culture), nor by examining images but by making them. Both anthropology and human geography have used visual images as research tools for as long as they have been established as academic disciplines, mostly photographs, diagrams and film in the case of anthropology, and photos, maps and diagrams in the case of geography. Visual sociology as a distinct sub-discipline is a more recent development; although the earliest sociological journals carried photographs for a short period before the First World War, it was not until the 1960s that a book by an anthropologist encouraged some sociologists to pick up their cameras again (Collier 1967). Researchers in these fields are taking heart from the current interest in questions of visuality to argue with greater conviction than ever for the analytical power of visual materials produced as part of a research project (see, for example, Banks 2001; Emmison and Smith 2000; Knowles and Sweetman 2004; Pink 2006; Prosser 1998; van Leeuwen and Jewitt 2001). However, when social scientists are making their own images, their concern for the power relations in which those images are embedded takes a specific form: it becomes a discussion of research ethics which reflects on the power dynamics between the researcher, the researched and the images. Chapter 11 of this book examines both the arguments for making visual images as a means of answering research questions, and the question of research ethics in relation to that making.

2 'visual culture': the social conditions and effects of visual objects

Making images as a way of answering a research question is relatively rare in studies of visual culture however. Instead, visual culture critics have concentrated their energies on critically examining the effects of visual images already out there in the world, already part of visual culture, and Chapters 3 to 10 of this book discuss a range of methods for understanding such 'found' images. This body of work has developed from several different theoretical positions (Barnard 2001; Bird et al. 1996; Evans and Hall 1999). Much of it is concerned to interpret the meaning of visual images, though some focuses more on practices of visuality or on the agency of visual objects; there are many historical studies, although some dispute the possibility of a fully historical account of an image's effect; some studies are more closely aligned with established academic disciplines like art history or cultural studies than others; some are structuralist and others post-structuralist; most of their methods are qualitative. This diversity obviously makes generalizing about studies of visuality a difficult task.

Nevertheless, I am going to suggest that there are five aspects of the recent literature that engage with visual culture that I think are valuable for thinking about the social effects of images.

The first point I take from the literature on (or against) 'visual culture' is its concern for the way in which images visualize (or render invisible) social difference. As Fyfe and Law (1988: 1) say, 'a depiction is never just an illustration ... it is the site for the construction and depiction of social difference'. One of the central aims of 'the cultural turn' in the social sciences was to argue that social categories are not natural but instead are constructed. These constructions can take visual form. This point has been made most forcefully by feminist and postcolonial writers who have studied the ways femininity and blackness have been visualized. An example would be Paul Gilroy's (1987: 57-9) discussion of a poster used by the Conservative Party in Britain's 1983 General Election, reproduced in Figure 1.1.

The poster shows a young black man in a suit, with 'LABOUR SAYS HE'S BLACK. TORIES SAY HE'S BRITISH' as its headline text. Gilroy's discussion is detailed but his main point is that the poster offers a choice between being black and being British, not only in its text but also in its image. The fact that the black man is pictured wearing a suit suggests to Gilroy that 'blacks are being invited to forsake all that marks them out as culturally distinct before real Britishness can be guaranteed' (Gilroy 1987: 59). Gilroy is thus suggesting that this poster asks its viewers not to see blackness. However, he also points out that the poster depends on other stereotyped images (which it does not show) of young black men, particularly as muggers, to make its point about the acceptability of this besuited man. This poster thus plays in complex ways with both visible and invisible signs of racial difference. Hence Fyfe and Law's general prescription for a critical approach to the ways images can picture social power relations:

To understand a visualisation is thus to enquire into its provenance and into the social work that it does. It is to note its principles of inclusion and exclusion, to detect the roles that it makes available, to understand the way in which they are distributed, and to decode the hierarchies and differences that it naturalises. (Fyfe and Law 1988: 1)

Looking carefully at images, then, entails, among other things, thinking about how they offer very particular visions of social categories such as class, gender, race, sexuality, able-bodiedness and so on.

Secondly, writers on visual culture, among others, are concerned not only with how images look, but how images are looked at. This is a key point made by Maria Sturken and Lisa Cartwright's (2001) book on visual culture, which they entitle Practices of Looking. They argue that what is important about images is not simply the image itself, but how it is seen by particular spectators who look in particular ways. Sturken and Cartwright (2001) take
With the Conservatives, there are black and white people. Conservatives believe that images show modernity as equal, encouraging the masses to treat them as equals.

Until the Labour Party aim to treat you as a special case in your own right. 

Setting you apart from the rest of society is a way to overcome racial prejudice and social inequality.

The question is, should we really divide the British people instead of uniting them?

When Labour wins in government, they promised to repeal the Immigration Acts passed in 1919 and 1938. Both promises were broken.

This time they are promising to dress up the British Nationality Act, which gives full and equal citizenship to everyone permanently settled in Britain.

How do the Conservatives' promises compare?

We said that we'll abolish the 'Asylum Law.'

We said we'd remove more coloured personnel, get the police back into the communities, and train them for a better understanding of your needs.

We keep our promise.

Figure 1.1

Conservative Party election poster, 1983

(Griffy 1987: 58)

In the average European oil painting of the nude, the principal protagonist is never painted. He is the spectator in front of the painting and he is presumed to be a man. Everything is addressed to him. Everything must appear to be the result of his being there. It is for him that the figures have assumed their nudity. (Berger 1972: 54)

Thus, for Berger, understanding this particular genre of painting means understanding not only its representation of femininity, but its construction of masculinity too. And these representations are in their turn understood as part of a wider cultural construction of gendered difference. To quote Berger again:

One might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between women and men but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed, female.

Their inspiration on this point from an influential book written in 1972 by John Berger, called Ways of Seeing. Berger's argument there is important because he makes clear that images of social difference work not simply by what they show but also by the kind of seeing that they invite. He uses the expression 'ways of seeing' to refer to the fact that 'we never look just at one thing; we are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves' (Berger 1972: 9). His best-known example is that of the genre of female nude painting in Western art. He reproduces many examples of that genre (see Figure 1.2), pointing out as he does so the particular ways they represent women: as unclothed, as vain, as passive, as sexually alluring, as a spectacle to be admired.

Berger insists though on who it is that does the assessing, who this kind of image was meant to allure:

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One might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between women and men but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed, female.
Thus she turns herself into an object – and most particularly an object of vision: a sight. (Berger 1972: 47, emphasis in original)

While later critics would want to modify aspects of Berger’s argument – most obviously by noting that he assumes heterosexuality in his discussion of masculinity and femininity – many critics would concur with his general understanding of the connection between image and spectator. Images work by producing effects every time they are looked at. Taking an image seriously, then, also involves thinking about how it positions you, its viewer, in relation to it.

Thirdly, there is the emphasis in the very term ‘visual culture’ on the embeddedness of visual images in a wider culture. Now, ‘culture’, as Raymond Williams (1976) famously noted, is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. It has many connotations. Most pertinent to this discussion is the meaning it began to be given in various anthropological books written towards the end of the nineteenth century. In this usage, culture meant something like ‘a whole way of life’, and even from the brief discussion in this chapter so far you can see that some current writers are using the term visual culture in just this broad sense. Indeed, one of the first uses of the term ‘visual culture’, by Svetlana Alpers (1983: xxv), was precisely to emphasize the importance of visual images of all kinds to many aspects of seventeenth century Dutch society. In this sort of work, it is argued that a particular, historically specific visuality was central to a particular, ocularcentric culture. In using the notion of culture in this broad sense, however, certain analytical questions may become difficult to ask. In particular, culture as a whole way of life can slip rather easily into a notion of culture as simply a whole, and the issue of difference becomes obscured. Barbara Maria Stafford’s (1996) celebration of the visual in ‘our’ society has been criticized by Hal Foster (1996) in just these terms. Stafford never specifies who the ‘we’ to which she refers actually is, and she thus ignores this visuality’s possible exclusions as well as the particularities of its inclusions.

In order to be able to deal with questions of social difference and the power relations that sustain them, then, a notion of culture is required that can also address questions of social difference, social relations and social power. One means of keeping these sorts of differentiations in the field of visual culture in analytical focus is to think carefully about just who is able to see what and how, and with what effects. Berger’s (1972) work is in some ways exemplary here. An image will depend for its effects on a certain way of seeing, as he argued in relation to female nude painting. But this effect is always embedded in particular cultural practices that are far more specific than ‘a way of life’. So Berger talks about the ways in which nude paintings were commissioned and then displayed by their owners in his discussion of the way of seeing which they express. Describing a seventeenth century English example of the genre, he writes:

Nominally it might be a Venus and Cupid. In fact it is a portrait of one of the king’s mistresses, Nell Gwynne ... (Her) nakedness is not, however, an expression of her own feelings; it is a sign of her submission to the owner’s feelings or demands. (The owner of both the woman and the painting) The painting, when the king showed it to others, demonstrated this submission and his guests envied him. (Berger 1972: 82)

It was through this kind of use, by those particular sorts of people interpreting it in that kind of way, that this kind of painting achieved its effects. The seeing of an image thus always takes place in a particular social context that mediates its impact. It also always takes place in a specific location with its own particular practices. That location may be a king’s chamber, a Hollywood cinema studio, an avant-garde art gallery, an archive, a sitting room, a street. These different locations all have their own economies, their own disciplines, their own rules for how their particular sort of spectator should behave, including whether and how they should look, and all these affect how a particular image is seen too (for an early example of this sort of approach, see Becker 1982). These specificities of practice are crucial in understanding how an image has certain effects.

Fourthly, much of this work in visual culture argues that the particular ‘audiences’ (that might not always be the appropriate word) of an image will bring their own interpretations to bear on its meaning and effect. Not all audiences will be able or willing to respond to the way of seeing invited by a particular image and its particular practices of display (Chapter 9 will discuss this in more detail).

Finally, in all of this work there is an insistence that images themselves have their own agency. In the words of Carol Armstrong (1996: 28), for example, an image is ‘at least potentially a site of resistance and recallance, of the irreducibly particular, and of the subversively strange and pleasurable’, while Christopher Pinney (2004: 8) suggests that the important question is ‘not how images “look”, but what they can “do”’. In the search for an image’s meaning, it is therefore important not to claim that it merely reflects meanings made elsewhere – in newspapers, for example, or gallery catalogues. It is certainly true that visual images very often work in conjunction with other kinds of representations. It is very unusual, for example, to encounter a visual image unaccompanied by any text at all, whether spoken or written (Armstrong 1998; Wollen 1970: 118); even the most abstract painting in a gallery will have a written label on the wall giving certain information about its making, and in certain sorts of galleries there are sheets of paper giving a price too, and these make a difference to how spectators will see that painting. So although virtually all visual images are multimodal in this way – they always make sense in relation to other things, including written texts and very often other images – they are not reducible to the meanings carried by those other things. The colours of an oil painting, for example, or what
Barthes (1982) called the punctum of a photograph (see Chapter 5, section 3.3), will carry their own peculiar kinds of visual resistance, recalcitrance, argument, particularity, strangeness or pleasure.

Thus I take five major points from current debates about visual culture as important for understanding how images work: an image may have its own visual effects (so it is important to look very carefully at images); these effects, through the ways of seeing mobilized by the image, are crucial in the production and reproduction of visions of social difference; but these effects always intersect with the social context of viewing and with the visualities spectators bring to their viewing.

**3 towards a critical visual methodology**

Given this general approach to understanding the importance of images, I can now elaborate on what I think is necessary for a 'critical approach' to interpreting found visual images. (The implications of this approach in relation to the production of images as part of a research project are somewhat different, as I've already suggested, and will be discussed in Chapter 11.) A critical approach to visual culture:

- takes images seriously. While this might seem rather a paradoxical point to insist on, given all the work I have just mentioned that addresses visualities and visual objects, art historians of all sorts of interpretive hues continue to complain, often rightly, that social scientists do not look at images carefully enough. I argue here that it is necessary to look very carefully at visual images, and it is necessary to do so because they are not entirely reducible to their context. Visual representations have their own effects.
- thinks about the social conditions and effects of visual objects. As Griselda Pollock (1988: 7) says, 'cultural practices do a job which has major social significance in the articulation of meanings about the world, in the negotiation of social conflicts, in the production of social subjects'. Cultural practices like visual representations both depend on and produce social inclusions and exclusions, and a critical account needs to address both these practices and their cultural meanings and effects.
- considers your own way of looking at images. This is not an explicit concern in many studies of visual culture. However, if, as section 2 just argued, ways of seeing are historically, geographically, culturally and socially specific; and if watching your favourite movie on a DVD for the umpteenth time at home with a group of mates is not the same as studying it for a research project; then, as Mieke Bal (1996, 2003; Bal and Bryson 2001) for one has consistently argued, it is necessary to reflect on how you as a critic of visual images are looking. As Haraway (1991: 190) says, by thinking carefully about where we see from, 'we might become answerable for what we learn how to see'. Haraway also comments that this is not a straightforward task (see also Rogoff 1998; Rose 1997). Several of the chapters will return to this issue of reflexivity in order to examine what it might entail further.

**4 towards some methodological tools: sites and modalities**

As I have already noted, the theoretical sources which have produced the recent interest in visual culture are diverse. This section will try to acknowledge some of that diversity, while also developing a framework for approaching the almost equally diverse range of methods that critics of visual culture have used.

Interpretations of visual images broadly concur that there are three sites at which the meanings of an image are made: the site(s) of the production of an image, the site of the image itself, and the site(s) where it is seen by various audiences. I also want to suggest that each of these sites has three different aspects. These different aspects I will call modalities, and I suggest that there are three of these that can contribute to a critical understanding of images:

- technological. Mirzoeff (1998: 1) defines a visual technology as 'any form of apparatus designed either to be looked at or to enhance natural vision, from oil paintings to television and the Internet'.
- compositional. Compositional refers to the specific material qualities of an image or visual object. When an image is made, it draws on a number of formal strategies: content, colour and spatial organization, for example. Often, particular forms of these strategies tend to occur together, so that, for example, Berger (1972) can define the Western art tradition painting of the nude in terms of its specific compositional qualities. Chapter 3 will elaborate the notion of composition in relation to paintings.
- social. This is very much a shorthand term. What I mean it to refer to are the range of economic, social and political relations, institutions and practices that surround an image and through which it is seen and used.

These modalities, since they are found at all three sites, also suggest that the distinctions between sites are less clear than my subsections here might imply. Many of the theoretical disagreements about visual culture, visualities and visual objects can be understood as disputes over which of these sites and
modalities are most important, how and why. The following subsections will explore each site and its modalities further, and will examine some of these disagreements in a little detail. To focus the discussion, and to give you a chance to explore how these sites and modalities intersect, I will often refer to the photograph reproduced in Figure 1.3. Take a good look at it now and note down your immediate reactions. Then see how your views of it alter as the following subsections discuss its sites and modalities.

4.1 the site of production
All visual representations are made in one way or another, and the circumstances of their production may contribute towards the effect they have.

Some writers argue this case very strongly. Some, for example, would argue that the technologies used in the making of an image determine its form, meaning and effect. Clearly, visual technologies do matter to how an image looks and therefore to what it might do and what might be done to it. Here is Berger describing the uniqueness of oil painting:

What distinguishes oil painting from any other form of painting is its special ability to render the tangibility, the texture, the lustre, the solidity of what it depicts. It defines the real as that which you can put your hands on. (Berger 1972: 88)

For a particular study it may be important to understand the technologies used in the making of particular images, and at the end of the book you will find some references which will help you do that.

In the case of the photograph here, it is perhaps important to understand what kind of camera, film and developing process the photographer was using, and what that made visually possible and what impossible. The photograph was made in 1948, by which time cameras were relatively lightweight and film was highly sensitive to light. This meant that, unlike in earlier periods, a photographer did not have to find subjects that would stay still for seconds or even minutes in order to be pictured. By 1948, the photographer could have stumbled on this scene and ‘snapped’ it almost immediately. Thus part of the effect of the photograph – its apparent spontaneity, a snapshot – is enabled by the technology used.

Another aspect of this photograph, and of photographs more generally, is also often attributed to its technology: its apparent truthfulness. Here, though, it must be noted that critical opinion is divided. Some critics (for example Roland Barthes, whose arguments are discussed in section 3.2 of Chapter 5, and Christopher Pinney, discussed in Chapter 10) suggest that photographic technology does indeed capture what was really there when the shutter snapped. Others find the notion that ‘the camera never lies’ harder to accept. From its very invention, photography has been understood by some of its practitioners as a technology that simply records the way things really look. But also from the beginning, photographs have been seen as magical and strange (Slater 1995). This debate has suggested to some critics that claims of ‘truthful’ photographic representation have been constructed. Chapter 8 will look at some Foucauldian histories of photography which make this case with some vigour. Maybe we see the Doisneau photograph as a snapshot of real life, then, more because we expect photos to show us snippets of truth than because they actually do. But this photo might have been posed: the photographer who took this one certainly posed others which nevertheless have the same ‘real’ look (Doisneau 1991). Also, as Griselda Pollock (1988: 85-7) points out in her discussion of this photograph, its status as a snapshot of real life is also established in part by its content, especially the boys playing in the street, just out of focus; surely if it had been posed those boys would have been in focus? Thus the apparently technological effects on the production of a visual image need careful consideration, because some may not be straightforwardly technological at all.

The second modality of an image’s production is to do with its compositionality. Some writers argue that it is the conditions of an image’s production that govern its compositionality. This argument is perhaps most effectively made in relation to the genre of images a particular image fits (perhaps rather uneasily) into. Genre is a way of classifying visual images into certain groups. Images that belong to the same genre share certain features. A particular genre will share a specific set of meaningful objects and locations,
and, in the case of movies for example, have a limited set of narrative problematic. Thus John Berger can define ‘female nude painting’ as a particular genre of Western painting because these are pictures which represent naked women as passive, available and desirable through a fairly consistent set of compositional devices. A certain kind of traditional art history would see the way that a particular artist makes reference to other paintings in the same genre (and perhaps in other genres) as he or she works at a canvas as a crucial aspect of understanding the final painting. It helps to make sense of the significance of elements of an individual image if you know that some of them recur repeatedly in other images. You may need to refer to other images of the same genre in order to explicate aspects of the one you are interested in. Many books on visual images focus on one particular genre.

The photograph under consideration here fits into one genre but has connections to some others, and knowing this allows us to make sense of various aspects of this rich visual document. The genre the photo fits most obviously into, I think, is that of ‘street photography’. This is a body of work with connections to another photography genre, that of the documentary (Hamilton 1997; see also Pryce 1997 for a discussion of documentary photography). Documentary photography originally tended to picture poor, oppressed or marginalized individuals, often as part of reformist projects to show the horror of their lives and thus inspire change. The aim was to be as objective and accurate as possible in these depictions. However, since the apparent horror was being shown to audiences who had the power to pressure for change, documentary photography usually pictures the relatively powerless to the relatively powerful. It has thus been accused of voyeurism and worse. Street photography shares with documentary photography the desire to picture life as it apparently is. But street photography does not want its viewers to say ‘oh how terrible’ and maybe ‘we must do something about that’. Rather, its way of seeing invites a response that is more like, ‘oh how

The third modality of production is what I have called the social. Here again, there is a body of work that argues that these are the most important factors in understanding visual images. Some argue that it is the economic processes in which cultural production is embedded that shape visual imagery. One of the most eloquent exponents of this argument is David Harvey. Certain photographs and films play a key role in his 1989 book The Condition of Postmodernity. He argues that these visual representations exemplify postmodernity. Like many other commentators, Harvey defines postmodernity in part through the importance of visual images to postmodern culture, commenting on ‘the mobilization of fashion, pop art, television and other forms of media image, and the variety of urban life styles that have become part and parcel of daily life under capitalism’ (Harvey 1989: 63). He sees the qualities of this mobilization as ephemeral, fluid, fleeting and superficial: ‘there has emerged an attachment to surface rather than roots, to collage rather than in-depth work, to superimposed quoted images rather than worked surfaces, to a collapsed sense of time and space rather than solidly achieved cultural artefact’ (Harvey 1989: 61). And Harvey has an explanation for this which focuses on the latter characteristics. He suggests that contemporary capitalism is organizing itself in ways that are indeed compressing time and collapsing space. He argues that capitalism is more and more ‘flexible’ in its organization of production techniques, labour markets and consumption niches, and that this has depended on the increased mobility of capital and information; moreover, the importance of consumption niches has generated the increasing importance of advertising, style and spectacle in the selling of goods. In his Marxist account, both these characteristics are reflected in cultural objects— in their superficiality, their ephemeralism and spectacle—so that the latter are nothing but ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’ (Harvey 1989: 63; Jameson 1984).

To analyse images through this lens you will need to understand contemporary economic processes in a synthetic manner. However, those writers who emphasize the importance of broad systems of production to the meaning of images sometimes deploy methodologies that pay rather little attention to the details of particular images. Harvey (1989), for example, has been accused of misunderstanding the photographs and films he interprets in his book—and of economic determinism (Deutsche 1991).

Other accounts of the centrality of what I am calling the social to the production of images depend on rather more detailed analyses of particular industries which produce visual images. David Morley and Kevin Robins (1995), for example, focus on the audiovisual industries of Europe in their study of how those industries are implicated in contemporary constructions of ‘Europeanness’. They point out that the European Union is keen to encourage a Europe-wide audiovisual industry partly on economic grounds, to compete with US and Japanese conglomerates. But they also argue that the EU has a cultural agenda too, which works at ‘improving mutual knowledge among European peoples and increasing their consciousness of the life and destiny they have in common’ (Morley and Robins 1995: 3), and thus elides differences within Europe while producing certain kinds of differences between Europe and the rest of the world. Like Harvey, then, Morley and Robins pay attention to both the economic and the cultural aspects of contemporary cultural practices. Unlike Harvey, however, Morley and Robins do not reduce the latter to the former. And this is in part because they rely on a more fine-grained analytical method than Harvey, paying careful attention to particular
Another aspect of the social production of an image is the social and/or political identities that are mobilized in its making. Peter Hamilton’s (1997) discussion of the sort of photography of which Figure 1.3 is a part explores its dependence on certain postwar ideas about the French working class. Here though I will focus on another social identity articulated through this particular photograph. Here is a passage from an introduction to a book on street photography that evokes the ‘crazy, cockeyed’ viewpoint of the street photographer:

It’s like going into the sea and letting the waves break over you. You feel the power of the sea. On the street each successive wave brings a whole new cast of characters. You take wave after wave, you bathe in it. There is something exciting about being in the crowd, in all that chance and change. It’s tough out there, but if you can keep paying attention something will reveal itself, just a split second, and then there’s a crazy cock-eyed picture! ... ‘Tough’ meant it was an uncompromising image, something that came from your gut, out of instinct, raw, of the moment, something that couldn’t be described in any other way. So it was TOUGH. Tough to like, tough to see, tough to make, tough to understand. The tougher they were the more beautiful they became. It was our language. (Westerbeck and Meyerowitz 1994: 2–3)

This rich passage allows us to say a bit more about the importance of a certain kind of identity to the production of the photograph under discussion here. To do street photography, it says, the photographer has to be there, in the street, tough enough to survive, tough enough to overcome the threats posed by the street. There is a kind of macho power being celebrated in that account of street photography, in its reiteration of ‘toughness’. This sort of photography also endows its viewer with a kind of toughness over the image because it allows the viewer to remain in control, positioned as somewhat distant and superior to what the image shows us. We have more information than the people pictured, and we can therefore smile at them. This particular photograph even places a window between us and its subjects; we peer at them from the same hidden vantage point just like the photographer did. There is a kind of distance established between the photographer/audience and the people photographed, then, reminiscent of the patriarchal way of seeing that has been critiqued by Haraway (1991), among others (see section 1 of this chapter). But since this toughness is required only in order to record something that will reveal itself, this passage is also an example of the way of seeing that has been critiqued by Haraway (1991), among others. (see also the focus in Chapter 3, section 3). First, as we have seen, there are those who argue that other modalities of an image’s production account for its effects. Secondly, there are those who argue that, since the image is always made and seen in relation to other images, this wider visual context is more significant for what the image means than what the artist thought they were doing. Roland Barthes (1977: 145–6) made this argument when he proclaimed the death of the author. And thirdly, there are those who insist that the most important site at which the meaning of an image is made is not its author, or indeed its production or itself, but its audiences, who bring their own ways of seeing and other knowledges to bear on an image and in the process make their own meanings from it. So I can tell you that the man who took this photograph in 1948 was Robert Doisneau, and that information will allow you, as it allowed me, to find out more information about his life and work. But the literature I am drawing on here would not suggest that an intimate, personal biography of Doisneau is necessary in order to interpret his photographs. Instead, it would read his life, as I did, in order to understand the modalities that shaped the production of his photographs.

4.2 the site of the image

The second site at which an image’s meanings are made is the image itself. Every image has a number of formal components. As the previous section suggested, some of these components will be caused by the technologies used to make, reproduce or display the image. For example, the black and white tonalities of the Doisneau photo are a result of his choice of film and processing techniques. Other components of an image will depend on
These are the politics of looking that Berger explored in his discussion of the Western tradition of female nude painting. 'One might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear', says Berger (1972: 47). In this photograph, the man looks at an image of a woman, while another woman looks but at nothing, apparently. Moreover, Pollock insists, the viewer of this photograph is pulled into complicity with these looks.

it is [the man's] gaze which defines the problematic of the photograph and it erases that of the woman. She looks at nothing that has any meaning for the spectator. Spatially central, she is negated in the triangulation of looks between the man, the picture of the fetishized woman and the spectator, who is thus enthralled to a masculine viewing position. To get the joke, we must be complicit with his secret discovery of something better to look at. The joke, like all dirty jokes, is at the woman's expense. (Pollock 1988: 47)

Pollock is discussing the organization of looks in the photograph and between the photograph and us, its viewers. She argues that this aspect of its formal qualities is the most important for its effect (although she has also mentioned the effect of spontaneity created by the out-of-focus boys playing in the street behind the couple, remember).

Such discussions of the compositional modality of the site of the image can produce persuasive accounts of a photograph's effect on its viewers. It is necessary to pause here, however, and note that there is a significant debate among critics of visual culture about how to theorize an image's effects. As I've already noted, some critics, often art historians, are concerned that many discussions of visual culture do not pay enough attention to the specifics of particular images. As a result they argue, visual images are reduced to nothing more than reflections of their cultural context. Pollock (1988: 25-30) herself has argued against such a strategy, and indeed her interpretation of the Doisneau photograph depends absolutely on paying very close attention to its visual and spatial structure and effects. However, hers is only one way to approach the question of an image's effects, and other critics advocate other ways. Caroline van Eck and Edward Winters (2005), for example, argue that the essence of a visual experience is its sensory qualities, qualities studiously ignored by Pollock, in her essay on Doisneau at least. Van Eck and Winters (2005: 4) emphasize that 'there is a subjective "feel" that is ineliminable in our seeing something', and that appreciation of this 'feel' should be as much part of understanding images as the interpretation of their meaning, even though they find it impossible to convey fully in words (see also Elkins 1998, Corbett 2005). Moreover, emerging from some critical quarters is a certain hesitation about full-on criticism of images' complicity with dominant ways of seeing class, 'race', gender, sexuality and so on. W.J.T. Mitchell (1996: 74), for example, has called this sort of work 'both easy and ineffectual' because it changes nothing of what it criticizes. Michael Ann Holly (in Cheetham, Holly and Moxey 2005: 88) has also worried that the urge to study visual culture simply in order to critique it seems 'to have sacrificed a sense of awe at the power of an overwhelming visual experience, wherever it might be found, in favour of the "political" connections that lie beneath the surface of this or that representation'. 'To me,' Holly continues, 'that's neither good "research" nor serious understanding.' Holly even suggests that the theoretical rigour with which so many visual culture studies are conducted may also have a deadening effect on images. 'There are many times', she says, 'when I yearn for something that is "in excess of research"' (Cheetham et al. 2005: 88).

What might this 'something in excess of research' be for which Holly yearns? All of these suspicions about the 'political' critique of images depend on claims that, in one way or another, visual materials have some sort of agency which exceeds, or is different from, the meanings brought to them by their producers and their viewers, including their visual culture critics. This is an interesting thread twisting its way through studies of visual culture, since
it suggests that culture – understood as cultural meanings and practices – may not be an adequate term to address fully all aspects of visualities. For if we agree that images can have their own effects, this is not always because they produce their own meanings. Rather, it may also be because they do something unique to their visuality which is also something excessive to meaning itself (hence van Eck and Winter’s [2005: 4] suggestion that it might not be possible to describe this effect in words). There are different understandings of this excess beyond the cultural, though. For van Eck and Winter (2005), as we have noted, it is the sensory and experiential nature of seeing (see also Mitchell 1996). For Ernst van Alphen (2005: 194–5), it is an image doing its own thinking, which presents puzzles to us on its own terms so that it becomes ‘not only the object of framing – which, obviously, is also true and important – but it also functions, in turn, as a frame for cultural thought’. For Alfred Gell (1998: 6), it is about the way that art objects (specifically) are ‘a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it’. For now, though, it is enough to note that there are a range of ways in which visual culture theorists have conceptualized the workings of the site of the image itself; subsequent chapters will develop their methodological implications.

4.3 the site of audiencing
You might well not agree with Pollock’s interpretation of the Doisneau photograph, and I will discuss some of the other interpretations of the image made by students in some of my classes in this section. Your disagreement, though, is the final site at which the meanings and effects of an image are made, for you are an audience of that photograph and, like all audiences, you bring to it your own ways of seeing and other kinds of knowledges. John Fiske (1994), for one, suggests that this is the most important site at which an image’s meanings are made, and uses the term audiencing to refer to the process by which a visual image has its meanings renegotiated, or even rejected, by particular audiences watching in specific circumstances. Once again, I would suggest that there are three aspects to this process.

The first is the compositionality of the image. Several of the methods that we will encounter in this book assume that the formal arrangement of the elements of a picture will dictate how an image is seen by its audiences. The notion of ways of seeing assumes just this. So too does Pollock when she claims that the Doisneau image is always seen as a joke against the woman, because the organization of looks by the photograph coincides with, and reiterates, a scopic regime that allows only men to look. It is important, I think, to consider very carefully the organization of the image, because that does have an effect on the spectator who sees it. There is no doubt, I think, that the Doisneau photograph pulls the viewer into a complicity with the man and his furtive look. But that does not necessarily mean the spectator sympathizes with that look. Indeed, many of my students often comment that the photograph shows the man (agreeing with Pollock, then, that the photograph is centred on the man) as a ‘lech’, a ‘dirty old man’, a ‘voyeur’. That is, they see him as the point of the photograph, but that does not make the photograph an expression of a way of seeing that they approve of. Moreover, that man and his look might not be the only thing that a particular viewer sees in that photograph, as I’ll suggest in a moment. Thus audiences make their own interpretations of an image.

Those theories that privilege the technological site at which an image’s meanings are made similarly often imply that the technology used to make and display an image will control an audience’s reaction. Again, this might be an important point to consider. How does seeing a particular movie on a television screen differ from seeing it on a large cinema screen with 3D glasses? How different is a reproduction in a book of an altarpiece from seeing the original in a church? Clearly at one level these are technological questions concerning the size, colour and texture, for example, of the image. At another level though they raise a number of other, more important questions about how an image is looked at differently in different contexts. You don’t do the same things while you’re flicking through a book of renaissance altarpieces at home as you do when you’re in a church looking at one. While you’re looking at a book you can be listening to music, eating, comparing one plate to another, answering the phone; in a church you may have to dress a certain way to get in, remain quiet, not get very close, not actually be able to see it at all well, let alone touch the image. Again, the audiencing of an image thus appears very important to its meanings.

The social is thus perhaps the most important modality for understanding the audiencing of images. In part this is a question of the different social practices which structure the viewing of particular images in particular places. Visual images are always practised in particular ways, and different practices are often associated with different kinds of images in different kinds of spaces. A cinema, a television in a living room and a canvas in a modern art gallery do not invite the same ways of seeing. This is both because, let’s say, a Hollywood movie, a TV soap and an abstract expressionist canvas do not have the same compositionality or depend on the same technologies, but also because they are not done in the same way. Popcorn is not sold by or taken into galleries, generally, and usually soaps are not watched in contemplative, reverential isolation. Different ways of relating to visual images define the cinema and the gallery, for example, as different kinds of spaces. You don’t applaud a sculpture the way you might do a film, for example, but applauding might depend on the sort of film and the sort of cinema you see it in. This point about the spaces and practices of display is especially important to bear in mind given the increasing mobility of images now; images appear and reappear in all sorts of places, and those places, with their particular ways of spectating, mediate the visual effects of those images.
Thus, to return to our example, you are looking at the Döisneau photograph in a particular way because it is reproduced in this book and is being used here as a pedagogic device; you're looking at it often (I hope – although this work on audiences suggests you may well not be bothering to do that) and looking at it in different ways depending on the issues I'm raising. You would be doing this photograph very differently if you had been sent it in the format of a postcard (and many of Döisneau's photographs have been reproduced as greetings cards, postcards and posters). Maybe you would merely have glanced at it before reading the message on its reverse far more avidly; if the card had been sent by a lover, maybe you would see it as some sort of comment on your relationship... and so on.

There is actually surprisingly little discussion of these sorts of topics in the literature on visual culture, even though 'audience studies', which most often explore how people watch television and videos in their homes, has been an important part of cultural studies for some time. There is also an important and relevant body of work in anthropology that treats visual images as objects, often as commodities, and sees what effects they have when such objects are gifted, traded or sold in different contexts. Chapters 9 and 10 of this book will explore these two approaches to the site of audiencing in more detail. As we will see, especially in Chapter 9, these approaches can rely on research methods that pay little attention to the images themselves. This is because many of those concerned with audiences argue that audiences are the most important aspect of an image's meaning. They thus tend, like those studies which privilege the social modality of the site of production of imagery, to use methods that do not address visual imagery directly.

The second and related aspect of the social modality of audiencing images concerns the social identities of those doing the watching. As Chapter 9 will discuss in more detail, there have been many studies which have explored how different audiences interpret the same visual images in very different ways, and these differences have been attributed to the different social identities of the viewers concerned.

In terms of the Döisneau photograph, it seemed to me that as I showed it to students over a number of years, their responses have changed in relation to some changes in ways of representing gender and sexuality in the wider visual culture of Britain from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. When I first showed it, students would often agree with Pollock's interpretation, although sometimes it would be suggested that the man looked rather hen-pecked and that this somehow justified his harmless fun. It would have been interesting to see if this opinion came significantly more often from male students than female, since the work cited above would assume that the gender of its audiences in particular would make a difference to how this photo was seen. As time went on, though, another response was made more frequently. And that was to wonder what the woman is looking at. For in a way, Pollock's argument replicates what she criticizes: the denial of vision to the woman. Instead, more and more of my students started to speculate on what the woman in the photo is admiring. Women students began quite often to suggest that of course what she is appreciating is a gorgeous semi-naked man, and sometimes they may, maybe it's a gorgeous woman. These later responses depended on three things, I think. One was the increasing representation over those few years of male bodies as objects of desire in advertising (especially, it seemed to me, in perfume adverts); we were more used now to seeing men on display as well as women. Another development was what I would very cautiously describe as 'girlpower'; the apparently increasing ability of young women to say what they want, what they really really want. And a third development might have been the fashionability in Britain of what was called 'lesbian chic'. Now of course, it would take a serious study (using some of the methods I will explore in this book) to sustain any of these suggestions, but I offer them here, tentatively, as an example of how an image can be read differently by different audiences: in this case, by different genders and at two slightly different historical moments.

There are, then, two aspects of the social modality of audiencing: the social practices of spectating and the social identities of the spectators. Some work, however, has drawn these two aspects of audiencing together to argue that only certain sorts of people do certain sorts of images in particular ways. Sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel (1991), for example, have undertaken large-scale surveys of the visitors to art galleries, and have argued that the dominant way of visiting art galleries – walking around quietly from painting to painting, appreciating the particular qualities of each one, contemplating them in quiet awe – is a practice associated with middle-class visitors to galleries. As they say, 'museum visiting increases very strongly with increasing level of education, and is almost exclusively the domain of the cultivated classes' (Bourdieu and Darbel 1991: 14). They are quite clear that this is not because those who are not middle-class are incapable of appreciating art. Bourdieu and Darbel (1991: 39) say that, 'considered as symbolic goods, works of art only exist for those who have the means of appropriating them, that is, of deciphering them'. To appreciate works of art you need to be able to understand, or to decipher, their style – otherwise they will mean little to you. And it is only the middle classes who have been educated to be competent in that deciphering. Thus they suggest, rather, that those who are not middle-class are not taught to appreciate art; that although the curators of galleries and the 'cultivated classes' would deny it, they have learnt what to do in galleries and they are not sharing their lessons with anyone else. Art galleries therefore exclude certain groups of people. Indeed, in other work Bourdieu (1984) goes further and suggests that competence in such techniques of appreciation actually defines an individual as middle-class. In order to be properly middle-class, one must know how to appreciate art, and how to perform that appreciation appropriately (no popcorn please).
The Doisneau photograph is an interesting example here again. Many reproductions of his photographs could be bought in Britain from a chain of shops called Athena (which went out of business some time ago). Athena also sold posters of pop stars, of cute animals, of muscle-bound men holding babies and so on. Students in my classes would be rather divided over whether buying such images from Athena was something they would do or not — whether it showed you had (a certain kind of) taste or not. I find Doisneau’s photographs rather sentimental and trite, rather stereotyped — and I rarely bought anything from Athena to stick on the walls of the rooms I lived in when I was a student. Instead, I preferred postcards of modernist paintings picked up on my summer trips to European art galleries. This was a genuine preference but I also know that I wanted the people who visited my room to see that I was ... well, someone who went to European art galleries. And students tell me that they often think about the images with which they decorate their rooms in the same manner. We know what we like, but we also know that other people will be looking at the images we choose to display. Our use of images, our appreciation of certain kinds of imagery, performs a social function as well as an aesthetic one. It says something about who we are and how we want to be seen.

These issues surrounding the audiencing of images are often researched using methods that are quite common in qualitative social science research: interviews, ethnography and so on. This will be explored in Chapters 9 and 10. However, as I have noted above, it is possible and necessary to consider the viewing practices of one spectator without using such techniques because that spectator is you. It is important to consider how you are looking at a particular image and to write that into your interpretation, or perhaps express it visually. Exactly what this call to reflexivity means is a question that will recur throughout this book.

5 summary

Visual imagery is never innocent; it is always constructed through various practices, technologies and knowledges. A critical approach to visual images is therefore needed: one that thinks about the agency of the image, considers the social practices and effects of its viewing, and reflects on the specificity of that viewing by various audiences including the academic critic. The meanings of an image or set of images are made at three sites — the sites of production, the image itself and its audiencing — and there are three modalities to each of these sites: technological, compositional and social. Theoretical debates about how to interpret images can be understood as debates over which of these sites and modalities is most important for understanding an image, and why. These debates affect the methodology that is most appropriately brought to bear on particular images; all of the methods discussed in this book are better at focusing on some sites and modalities than others.

With these general points in mind, the next chapter explains some different ways to use this book.

Further reading

Stuart Hall in his essay 'The work of representation' (1997b) offers a very clear discussion of recent debates about culture, representation and power. A useful collection of some of the key texts that have contributed towards the field of visual culture has been put together by Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall as Visual Culture: The Reader (1999). Sturken and Cartwright’s Practices of Looking (2001) is an excellent overview of both theoretical approaches to visual culture, and of many of its empirical manifestations in the affluent world today.
8

Discourse Analysis II
Institutions and Ways of Seeing

The previous chapter began with a brief introduction to the work of Michel Foucault, and suggested that there are two methodologies that have developed from his work. Although these two are related and overlap — most particularly because they share a concern with power/knowledge as it is articulated through discourse — these two methodologies have tended to produce rather different sorts of research. The first type of discourse analysis, discussed in chapter 7, works with visual images and written or spoken texts. Although it is certainly concerned with the social positions of difference and authority that are articulated through images and texts, it tends to focus on the production and rhetorical organization of visual and textual materials.

In contrast, the second form of discourse analysis, which this chapter will explore, often works with similar sorts of materials, but is much more concerned with their production by, and their reiteration of, particular institutions and their practices, and their production of particular human subjects. This difference can be clarified by looking at how two exponents of these two kinds of discourse analysis use the term 'archive'. In her discussion of the first type of discourse analysis, Tonkiss (1998: 252) describes the material that that sort of analysis works with as an 'archive'. While Tonkiss herself puts the term in inverted commas, clearly aware that it carries a certain conceptual baggage, she neverthelehs uses it to refer to her collection of data, and then moves on to consider what the data shows about certain discursive formations. However, a different kind of discourse analyst, like Alan Sekula (1986, 1989), would spend some time examining the archive itself as an institution, and unpacking the consequences of its particular practices of classification for the meanings of the things placed within it. Referring to archives of photographs in particular, he argues that:

Archives are not neutral; they embody the power inherent in accumulation, collection and hoarding as well as that power inherent in the command of the lexicon and rules of a language ... any photographic archive, no matter how small, appeals indirectly to these institutions for its authority. (Sekula 1986: 155)

No doubt Tonkiss would agree with this comment. However, Sekula is at pains to explore the effects of 'archivalization' on texts and images in a way that Tonkiss is not. Sekula and writers like him make that analytical move because they place their understandings of discourses firmly in relation to the account of institutions given by Foucault. Archives are one sort of institution, in the Foucauldian sense, and this second sort of analysis would not treat them as transparent windows onto source materials in the way that Tonkiss seems to. Archives work in quite particular ways that have effects on what is stored within them, and on those who use them (Rose 2000).

As we have seen, several of Foucault's books examine specific institutions and their disciplines: prisons, hospitals, asylums. For writers concerned with visual matters, perhaps the key text is Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977). Subtitled The Birth of the Prison, this is an account of changing penal organization in post-medieval Europe, in which alterations in the organization of visuality (and spatiality) are central. The book begins by quoting a contemporary account of a prolonged torture and execution carried out as a public spectacle in 1757. Foucault then quotes from a prison rulebook written eighty years later which is, as he says, a timetable. Foucault's questions are, how (rather than why) did this change in penal style, from spectacular punishment to institutional routine, take place? And with what effects? Through detailed readings of contemporary texts, Discipline and Punish traces this shift. By the mid-nineteenth century:

the punishment-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as a property. The body, according to this penalty, is caught up in a system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensation punishment has become an economy of suspended rights ... As a result of this new restraint, a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain — warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists ...

(Foucault 1977: 11)
The prison was born. As well as a new institution and a new understanding of punishment, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault describes the emergence of a new set of professions who defined who needed punishment and who could exercise that punishment, and of a new subjectivity produced for those so punished: what he called the ‘docile body’. This was the body subjected to these new penal disciplines, the body which had to conform to its ‘constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions’.

A key point of Foucault’s argument is that in this new regime of punishment, these docile bodies in a sense disciplined themselves, and Foucault argues that this was achieved through a certain visuality (for general discussions of the role of visuality in the work of Foucault, see Jay [1993] and Rajchman [1988]). Once defined by the new ‘expert’ knowledges as in some way deviant, these bodies were placed in an institution that was ‘a machine for altering minds’ (Foucault 1977: 125). Foucault (1977: 195–228) expands this point, and demonstrates the importance of a visuality to it, by discussing a plan for an institution designed by Jeremy Bentham in 1791. Bentham called this building a panopticon, and suggested it could be used as the plan for all sorts of disciplining institutions: prisons, but also hospitals, workhouses, schools, madhouses. The panopticon was a tall tower, surrounded by an annular building. The latter consisted of cells, one for each inmate, with windows so arranged that the occupant was always visible from the tower. The tower was the location of the supervisor but because of the arrangement of its windows, blinds, doors and corridors, the inmates in their cells could never be certain that they were under observation from the tower at any particular moment. Never certain of invisibility, each inmate therefore had to behave ‘properly’ all the time: thus they disciplined themselves and were produced as docile bodies. ‘Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault 1977: 210). This sort of visuality, in which one subject is seen without ever seeing, and the other sees without ever being seen, Foucault called surveillance, and he argued that, since it was an efficient means of producing social order, it became a dominant form of functionality throughout modern capitalist societies. Through its operation, says Foucault (1977: 200) (in an echo of Lacan), ‘visibility is a trap’.

Foucault suggests that institutions work in two ways: through their apparatus and through their technologies. This is a distinction this chapter will use; however, Foucault was rather inconsistent in his use of these terms, and the distinction made here between them is clearer than that found in his work. An *institutional apparatus* is the forms of power/knowledge that constitute the institutions: for example, architecture, regulations, scientific treatises, philosophical statements, laws, morals, and so on, and the discourse articulated through all these (Hall 1997b: 47). Hence Foucault described Bentham’s panopticon as an apparatus: at once an architectural design and a moral and philosophical treatise. The *institutional technologies* (sometimes difficult to differentiate from the apparatus) are the practical techniques used to produce that power/knowledge. Technologies are ‘diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse … often made up of bits and pieces … a disparate set of tools and methods’ (Foucault 1977: 26). An example might be the design of the windows and blinds in the panopticon.

It has been argued by some historians of photography that photography must be understood as a technology in this Foucauldian sense. John Tagg, for example, writes:

> Photography as such has no identity. Its status as technology varies with the power relations that invest it. Its nature as a practice depends on the institutions and agents which define it and set it to work … Its history has no unity. It is a flickering across a field of institutional spaces. It is this field we must study, not photography as such. (Tagg 1988: 63)

For Tagg, photography is diffuse; it is given coherence only by its use in certain institutional apparatuses. He elaborates this claim by studying photographs as they were used in the nineteenth century by police forces, prisons, orphanages, asylums, local government’s medical officers of health, and newspaper journalists and publicists. It is its uses in these institutions that Tagg argues gives photography its status as a unified something rather than a diffuse no one thing, and that coherent something is, according to Tagg, the belief that photographs picture the real. (Hence he is very critical of Barthes’s (1982) assertion, discussed in section 3.2 of Chapter 5, that the *punctum* of a photograph is a trace of an uncoded referent.) The apparatus of these various institutions – the police, prisons, orphanages, asylums, local government, the emergent mass media – asserted the truth of their claims to be able to detect, or punish, or cure the criminal, the ill, the orphaned, the mad, the degenerate (in part by relying on the scientific status of the discourses of physiognomy and phrenology, discussed in the previous chapter). Producing a certain regime of truth, these institutions used photography as a crucial technology through which these distinctions were made visible. The related opposite of this, as Sekula (1989) notes, was the detection, celebration and honouring of the moral, the familial and the proper in bourgeois photographic portraiture. Thus the institutional uses of photography make us think photographs are truthful pictures, not photographic techniques themselves. For Tagg, then (and see also Lalvani 1996; Sekula 1989), Foucault’s emphasis on institutions and power/knowledge is crucial for understanding the belief that photography pictures the real.

This emphasis on institutional apparatus and technologies gives a different inflection to this second kind of discourse analysis. It shifts attention away from the details of individual images – although both Tagg (1988) and Sekula (1989) describe the general characteristics of particular types of photographs – and towards the processes of their production and use. That is, this type of
discourse analysis concentrates most on the sites of production and audiences, in their social modality. In their discussion of nineteenth century police photography, for example, both Sekula and Tagg pay a good deal of attention to the processes used to classify, file, retrieve and use photographs of those who had been pictured as ‘criminal’. They both also argue that photography was only one part of what Sekula (1989: 351) calls ‘a bureaucratic-clerical-statistical system of “intelligence”’, and he suggests that the filing cabinet was actually a more important piece of institutional technology than the camera. They discuss other technologies – such as phenology and fingerprinting – that were used alongside photography, and they explore other aspects of institutional apparatuses in their studies too. This means that the sources used in their accounts are as eclectic as those of the discourse analysts discussed in Chapter 7. However, certainly in the case of Tagg and Sekula, their work is held together by an insistence on the power relations articulated through these practices and institutions. Visual images and visualities are for them articulations of institutional power.

This is one aspect of their work that has been criticized. For although both take care to distinguish their Foucauldian understanding of power from those that see power simply as repressive, nonetheless there is very little sense in either of their work of the possibility of visualities other than those of dominant institutions. Lindsay Smith (1998), for example, takes them to task for not looking at a wide enough range of nineteenth century photographic practices, and in particular for neglecting the kinds of domestic photography practised by a number of women in the mid-nineteenth century. These women photographers can be seen as producing images that do not replicate the surveillance gaze of the police mug-shot or the family studio portrait: they thwart that classifying gaze by strategies such as blurred focus, collage and over-exposure. Moreover, like their discourse analyst cousins whose work was discussed in the previous chapter, there is very little reflexivity in this second type of discourse-analytical work. Ironically, considering their critique of truth claims, Tagg and Sekula both make very strong claims themselves about the veracity of their accounts. Tagg (1988: 1–2) in particular is quite scathing about Barthes, implying that Barthes’s insistence on the uncoded quality of certain photographs was merely an emotional response to his search for a photograph that would remind him of his mother after she had died. ‘I need not point out’, says Tagg (1988: 2) ‘that the existence of a photograph is no guarantee of a corresponding pre-photographic existent.’ Tagg here counterposes the self-evident (‘I need not point out ...’), which he later expands at great length with the use of much theory, to the emotional need driving Barthes’s work: as I read it, Tagg is making an opposition between his masculinized rationality and what he sees as the effeminate emotionality of the grieving Barthes. Hardy a self-reflexive stance, I think.

This chapter though will not focus on the work of Tagg or Sekula and their interest in photographic archives. Rather, it will turn to work that considers two other kinds of institutions that deal with visual objects – the art gallery and the museum – and that have also been subject to Foucauldian critique by writers such as Tony Bennett (1995) and Eilean Hooper-Greenhill (1992) (other important discussions include Starr [2005] and the essays collected by Barker [1999], Greenberg, Ferguson and Nairne [1996], Preziosi and Farago [2004], Sherman and Rogoff [1994] and Vergo [1989]). These accounts explore how visual images and objects are produced in particular ways by institutional apparatuses and technologies (as ‘art’, for example) and how various subjectivities are also produced, such as the ‘curator’ and ‘the visitor’. However, these are institutions which, while of course not free from the workings of power, are not as obviously coercive as those examined by Tagg and Sekula. Their disciplines are more subtle, and they thus provide a more fruitful ground for exploring the extent to which this second type of discourse analysis can add questions of conflicting discourses and contested ways of seeing. The particular case study will be the American Museum of Natural History in New York (hereafter referred to as the AMNH), as seen by Donna Haraway (1989: 26–58), Ann Reynolds (1995), Timothy Luke (2002) and Mieke Bal (1996: 13–56) (although Bal’s account also incorporates a semiotic approach). Their accounts will also allow another opportunity to consider the possibility of a reflexive discourse-analytic practice.

The status of the art gallery and museum as institution provides a way of examining the methodology of this second kind of discourse analysis. So, this chapter will:

- examine ways of describing the apparatus of the art gallery and the museum;
- examine ways of describing the technologies of the art gallery and the museum;
- examine how this second kind of discourse analysis argues that these institutions produce and discipline their visitors;
- assess the strengths and weaknesses of this type of discourse analysis of institutions.

2 finding your sources for discourse analysis II

The kinds of sources used for this kind of discourse analysis are as diverse as those deployed by the discourse analysis discussed in Chapter 7. A key Foucauldian account of the emergence of the art gallery and the museum as particular kinds of institutions is Tony Bennett’s *The Birth of the Museum* (1995), and he is typical in his use of a wide range of sources. He undertakes a careful reading of the many *written texts* that discussed museums and galleries in the second half of the nineteenth century. These were produced by reformers, philanthropists, civil servants and curators who were all arguing, though often in different ways, for the establishment of galleries and
museums that were open to the public. Studies of current discussions about museums and their practices supplement this sort of historical written source with other types of documents available now, such as the annual reports of galleries and museums and their mission statements. Interviews with the directors, curators and designers of museums and galleries can also be used in contemporary studies (although Phillips and Hardy [2002: 71] suggest that naturally occurring talk is more valid for discourse analysis than talk produced in the context of a research project). Both historical and contemporary studies often use photographs or other visual images of buildings, rooms and displays too, sometimes simply as illustrations to their written accounts, and both also pay attention to the architecture of the institution: its design, decorations, inscriptions, layout and so on. Studies of contemporary museums and galleries also often rely on visits to the institution and observation of the way people visit and work in them.

In relation to studies of the AMNH, Luke's (2002) study is primarily archival, while both Haraway (1989) and Reynolds (1995), writing historical accounts of particular halls of that museum, use written texts such as the autobiographies of curators, the minutes of museum committee meetings, scientific texts and the museum's annual reports; Haraway (1989) supplements this with an account of what the hall she is interested in looks like to the visitor now: or, at least, what it looks like to Haraway now. Both illustrate their arguments using photographs of museum displays and other images. Bal's (1996) account is a reading of a few halls of the museum based entirely on their layout and the displays on show to the visitor in late 1991. (Her study is also interesting in the way it uses illustrations to make her points, as well as written text.)

focus

Visit a gallery or a museum. When we visit a museum or a gallery, it is somehow clear that certain things are 'the objects to be looked at': the paintings, the objects, the items in the shop. This time, spend time looking at other things: the architecture of the building, for example, its floor plan, its warders, its other visitors.

3 the apparatus of the gallery and the museum

As Stephen Bann comments, the history of museums can be interpreted:

grosso modo in terms of two conceptually distinct phases. The first, roughly speaking up to the end of the eighteenth century, qualifies as a 'prehistory'

in the sense that the collection and display of objects appears to answer no clear principles of ordering by genre, school, and period. The second, which represents an almost irresistible movement towards conformity over the course of the last two centuries, is a history in which the museum has developed and perfected its own principles of ordering by giving spatial distribution to the concepts of school and period, in particular. (Bann 1998: 231; see also Hooper-Greenhill 1992)

Bennett's (1995) discussion of museums and galleries focuses on the second of these phases, and draws much theoretical inspiration from Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Bennett points out that both prisons and modern museums were born in broadly the same historical period, and he argues that they deployed a similar disciplining surveillance. In making this claim, Bennett interprets his sources using the kinds of methods discussed in the previous chapter. Thus he too looks for key themes, for truth claims, for complexity and for absences (see Chapter 7, section 4.1). He pays attention to the diversity of ways in which public museums and galleries were justified by nineteenth century commentators, noting, for example, that they were defended as an antidote to working-class men's drunkenness, as an alternative to working-class disaffection and riot, and as a means to civilize manners and morals. But his overall emphasis is very much on the way this discursive formation produced the museum as a disciplining machine:

the museum, in providing a new setting for works of culture, also functioned as a technological environment which allowed cultural artefacts to be refashioned in ways that would facilitate their deployment for new purposes as part of governmental programmes aimed at reshaping general norms of social behaviour. (Bennett 1995: 6)

His concern, then, is with the power that saturated the museum and gallery, and he explores that power in terms of those institutions' apparatuses. In particular, he focuses on particular discourses of culture and science that shaped their design and practice, and also produced certain subject positions. Hooper-Greenhill (1992: 176), too, is interested in the way 'new technologies and new subject positions were constituted through the administration of [a museum's] newly acquired material'.

Bennett argues that there was a specific discourse of 'culture' which saturated the births of the museum and gallery. Using the sources mentioned in section 2, he argues that the power of museums and galleries had the same aim: both use 'culture' as a tool of social management. He notes that the definition of 'culture' used in the two sorts of institutions is somewhat different and that does produce some differences between them, especially in the sorts of objects they display. In the museum, 'culture' tends to refer to that later nineteenth century understanding of culture as 'a whole way of life', and
museums often collect objects that are meant to exemplify the way of life of particular social groups. In the nineteenth century, this often meant that museums collected and displayed the artefacts of colonized peoples, and these peoples were seen as less cultured and more natural than those of the West. (Annie Coombes [1994] discusses nineteenth-century displays of African artefacts in European and North American museums in her book Reinvesting Africa.) Bal's (1996) account of her 1991 visit to the AMNH emphasizes its continued articulation of imperialist white discourse, noting that halls showing the way of life of certain colonized peoples are entered directly after halls displaying stuffed mammals and birds, thus implying that certain groups are closer to nature than others. Galleries, on the other hand, work with an older definition of 'culture' as that which can ennoble the human spirit, and the objects they display are those defined as Art (see the focus in Chapter 3 section 3.5 for more on this notion of Art). Such objects — usually paintings and sculpture from Western traditions — are then also constituted as 'Art', and as noble and uplifting, by being on display.

Bennett also discusses, more briefly, a specific discourse of science that was part of the museum's apparatus of power. In museums, he notes, objects are always classified according to what are claimed to be 'scientific' or 'objective' principles, whether they be drawn from notions of historical progress, scientific rationality or anthropological analysis.

Bal (1996) remarks that differentiations made by the complex discourse of culture are expressed in the gallery and museum that flank either side of Central Park in New York. On the one side, the AMNH, on the other, the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

By this very division of the city map, the universal concept of 'humanity' is filled with specific meaning. The division of 'culture' and 'nature' between the East Side and the West Side of Manhattan relegates the large majority of the world's population to the status of static being, assigning to a small portion only the higher status of art producers in history. Where 'nature', in the [AMNH] dioramas, is a backdrop, transfixed in stasis, 'art', presented in the Met as an ineluctable evolution, is endowed with a story. (Bal 1996: 13–16)

In his account of the AMNH, Luke (2002) prefers to focus on the parallels between its collecting practices and those of US corporations, suggesting that the museum's 'searches for fossilised bones mimic the quest of large-scale sweeps by American capital through every remote expanse of the world in search of other organic goods from the Paleozoic era, like coal, oil, gas, or pre-Paleozoic inorganic minerals, like gold, silver, copper, bauxite, or iron' (Luke 2002: 121).

Bennett (1995) also pays much attention to the way the architecture of museums and galleries articulated these various discourses of culture, art and science. As well as the distinction between two sorts of building — the museum and the gallery — there are the imposing facades and entrance halls of many nineteenth-century galleries and museums, for example, which were designed to be as inspiring and uplifting as the understanding of culture and science articulated within. Haraway looks at the façade of the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial — the main building of the AMNH — and considers the effects of its design:

The facade of the memorial... is classical, with four Ionic columns 54 feet high topped by statues of the great explorers Boone, Audubon, Lewis and Clark. The coin-like, bas-relief seals of the United States and of the Liberty Bell are stumped on the front panels. Inscribed across the top are the words TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, VISION and the dedication to Roosevelt as 'a great leader of the youth of America, in energy and fortitude in the faith of our fathers, in defense of the rights of the people, in the love and conservation of nature and of the best in life and in man'. Youth, paternal solicitude, virile defense of democracy, and intense emotional connection to nature are the unmistakable themes. (Haraway 1989: 27)

The internal layout also echoes the discourses of science and culture. In the case of galleries, for example, paintings are hung in groups in separate rooms according to periods and (often national) schools, and this works to naturalize these periods, schools and nations, and also to produce a narrative of development from medieval painting to the present day (Bal's art production in history; see also Bann 1998).

As well as these architectural articulations, Bennett (1995) is especially concerned to examine the social subjectivities produced through these discursive apparatuses. The strong emphasis he places on how discourse produces social positions, and the consequences for how museums were designed and policed, distinguishes his study from many of those that rely on the type of discourse analysis examined in Chapter 7. He identifies three subject positions produced by the museum and gallery. First, there were the patrons of these new institutions. Thus he is clear that the emergent 'experts' on museum and gallery policy and patronage were white middle-class men, their social position produced through their claims to 'expertness' as well as through the larger discourses of capitalism, patriarchy and racism. Similarly, Haraway (1989: 54–8), in her discussion of the AMNH as 'institution' in the early twentieth century, carefully explores the intersecting discourses of eugenics, exhibition and conservation that were mobilized to justify the founding of the museum, and also notes those three discursive themes were all 'prescriptions against decadence, the dread disease of imperialist, capitalist, white culture' (Haraway 1989: 55). The museum's funders were precisely representatives of 'imperialist, capitalist, white culture', and thus she too is clear on the coincidence between the discourses of the museum and the wider power relations of society. Richard Bolton (1989) offers a more recent example of the effects
of exhibition patronage in his discussion of the sponsorship of an exhibition of Richard Avedon photographs at the Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston by a local department store. Secondly, there were the scientists and curators: the technical experts, if you like, who operationalized those discourses of culture and science in their classifying and displaying practices (section 4.5 will return to these latter practices; Bennett pays them little attention). And thirdly, there are the visitors. The visitor with whom the nineteenth century patrons of museums and galleries were most concerned was produced as the morally weak, probably drunk, working-class man. The contemplation of art and the appreciation of museums' knowledge was constructed discursively by these patrons as involving particular ways of visiting museums and galleries, and Bennett (1995) argues that these ways involved orderly appreciation rather than unruly entertainment. In ways he less-than-convincingly demonstrates, he argues that both sorts of institutions disciplined their visitors into what were seen as civilized ways of behaving. Bennett again pays some attention to the visual and spatial aspects of museums and galleries when making this argument, examining architectural plans and noting the way that surveillance of other visitors was often built into the designs of these institutions; he also reproduces some contemporary photographs of museums and exhibitions taken from positions which he claims again articulate the surveillance quality of these spaces. He thus suggests that museums and galleries worked to regulate social behaviour by producing docile bodies. Reynolds (1995) discusses a hall of the AMNH in the 1950s, and notes how it too stand the dioramas in the Akeley African Hall, it is necessary to understand so on that were articulated through them. However, the broad aims of these discussions of institutional apparatus are I hope clear. In their exploration of institutional apparatuses, these discourse analysts of institutional power/knowledge focus on both discourses about museums and galleries but also on how those discourses are materialized in the forms of architecture and subject positions. Their concern is always with the intersection of power/knowledge and with the production of differentiated subject positions.

4 the technologies of the gallery and museum

Section 1 of this chapter defined institutional technologies as the practical techniques used to articulate particular forms of power/knowledge: 'the techniques of effecting meanings' (Haraway 1989: 35). Foucault described them as diffuse and disparate sets of bits and pieces, and this section will enumerate some of these bits and pieces as they work in museums and galleries. The question posed by this second type of discourse analysis is, again, what the effects of certain technologies are in terms of what they produce; and Bann (1998) insists that this question demands carefully detailed and
Section 3 has already touched on some aspects of how images and objects are displayed in museums and galleries, but at the large scale: how buildings are differentiated into museums or galleries, how whole rooms are labelled and how this then classifies objects and paintings in particular ways. This section instead will focus on more small-scale techniques of display. These are usually accessed by researchers through visits to museums or galleries, or through historical documentation.

In museums, several technologies of display are available (Lidchi 1997: 172):

- **display cases**, mounted either on walls or on tables;
- **open display**, with no protective cover;
- **reconstructions**, which are supposedly life-like scenes. (The dioramas discussed by Haraway [1989] and Luke [2002] in the AMNH are a particular sort of reconstruction);
- **simulacra**: objects made by the museum in order to fill a gap in their collection.

Each of these different display techniques can have rather different effects, and their precise effects very often depend on their intersection with other technologies, especially written text. For example, Lidchi (1997: 173) suggests that reconstructions in museums usually consist of everyday objects put together with some kind of reference to their everyday use. Reconstructions thus depend on the presence of 'real' artefacts in an 'accurate' combination, and this makes their display seem truthful; although, as Lidchi also points out, this effect also depends on the visitor's prior faith in the accuracy of the anthropological knowledge used to make the display. Glass display cases, on the other hand, produce a truth not in relation to the apparent from the everyday context that reconstructions attempt to evoke, and is instead placed in the classificatory schema of the museum. Again though, the presence of actual artefacts in an 'accurate' combination, and this makes their display seem truthful; although, as Lidchi also points out, this effect also depends on the visitor's prior faith in the accuracy of the anthropological knowledge used to make the display.

Reynolds's (1995) discussion of the Felix Warburg Man and Nature Hall in the AMNH, which opened in 1951, is an especially detailed exploration of the way of seeing invited by a particular group of displays. The displays in this Hall refuse the apparent reality of the dioramas that Haraway (1989) discusses. Instead, Reynolds shows how they offer a visually and spatially fragmented, and clearly illusionistic, series of views of a landscape that draw the visitor closer in for a detailed look at each of the component parts. The effect, 'through foregrounding the very devices of illusionism', says Reynolds (1995: 99), is to transform the visitor's eyes into magnifying glasses, microscopes, or scalpels, which could reveal the invisible workings of a previously familiar but superficially understood natural world'. Hence the spatial organization of these displays still produces a reality effect, but it is a rather different one from those that Haraway (1989) and Bal (1996) explore.

In the case of the gallery, consider how the images are framed and hung. Paintings are now very often hung in a single row around the walls of a room, inviting you to follow them round, looking at each one in turn. That is, they are hung as individual images. This is a twentieth century practice (Celant 1996; Waterfield 1991); in the nineteenth century it was very common instead for the walls of galleries to be packed almost from floor to ceiling with paintings. This change is associated with increasingly detailed modes of classification and changing notions of Art. The discourse of Art as something to be contemplated for universal truths, which section 3 of this chapter described (see also section 3.5 of Chapter 3), became widespread in the twentieth century, and it changed hanging practices. If paintings are hung side by side, it is possible to contemplate each of them individually as pieces of Art. This also has an effect on the viewer: to encourage that contemplative way of viewing (Duncan 1995). The combination of this kind of hanging with the layout of galleries often heightens this effect. As Jean-Francois Lyotard says of the spectator at an exhibition:
the visitor is an eye. The way he looks, not only at the works exhibited but also at the place where the exhibition takes place, is supposedly governed by the principles of ‘legitimate construction’ established in the quattrocento: the geometry of the domination over perceptual space. (Lyotard 1996: 167)

Thus it could be argued that both the image and the viewer are individualized through this technology of hanging, and that viewers are produced as contemplative eyes and paintings as objects to be contemplated.

focus

What technologies of display are used in the gallery or museum you visited? Is the list of possibilities provided in this section adequate to their description? Or are there technologies of display that you want to consider?

4.2 textual and visual technologies of interpretation

These sorts of display effects always work in conjunction with other technologies, especially written and visual ones. There are a number of textual technologies to consider, and they can be interpreted using the tools of the first kind of discourse analysis, described in Chapter 7.

- labels and captions. These are a key way in which objects and images are produced in particular ways. For example, in a gallery, a painting will always have a caption with the name of the artist; it will almost always have the date of the painting and its title, and very often the materials it was made with. These apparently innocuous pieces of information nonetheless work to prioritize certain sorts of information about paintings over others. In particular, it makes the artist the most important aspect of the painting, in accordance with the notions of Art and Genius examined in section 3.5 of Chapter 3: whereas Chapter 1 was at pains to suggest that there are many other aspects of an image that are much more important than who made it. In a museum, labels have similar effects: they make some aspects of the objects on display more important than others. Bal (1991: 32) notes that labels and captions at the AMNH almost always deploy a rhetoric of realism – ‘realism, the description of a world so lifelike that omissions are unnoticed, elisions sustained, and repressions invisible’ – which makes it difficult for visitors to question the kinds of knowledge they offer.

- panels. Both galleries and museums often have large display panels of text in their display rooms. These often provide some sort of wider context for the objects or images on display. In the case of the exhibition discussed by Lidchi (1997), the panels were where the exhibition’s practices of representation were made explicit. Panels often are more explicitly interpretive than labels and captions.

- catalogues. Most larger exhibitions, and many galleries and museums, produce catalogues for sale. These too are part of their technologies of interpretation. Like labels, captions and display panels, though, they convey very particular kinds of knowledge.

Visual technologies can also shape the effects of a museum or gallery. Museums often use photographs as part of display panels or catalogues to show what the use of an object ‘really’ was, or to assert the authenticity of an object on display by showing a picture of it, or one like it, in its original context of use. Galleries use photographs in display panels much less often, but their catalogues often have them, again usually as apparently documentary images.

All of these visual and textual technologies can be examined using the method of discourse analysis described in Chapter 7. Read them for their key themes, their claims to truth, their complexities and their silences.

4.3 technologies of layout

Section 3 has already touched on aspects of the overall layout of museum and gallery space. Here some of its smaller-scale spatial and visual effects will be explored.

First, there is the layout of an individual room. As Kevin Hetherington (1997: 215) says, ‘as classifying machines, museums have to deal with heterogeneity through the distribution of effects in space’. Hence the importance of the spatial organization of displays and buildings, but also
of rooms. Haraway's (1989) discussion of the Akeley African Hall in the AMNH describes the effect of its spatial organization by means of an analogy:

The Hall is darkened, lit only from the display cases which line the sides of the spacious room. In the center of the Hall is a group of elephants so lifelike that a moment's fantasy suffices for awakening a premonition of their movement, perhaps an angry charge at one's personal intrusion. The elephants stand like a high altar in the nave of a great cathedral. The impression is strengthened by one's growing consciousness of the dioramas that line both sides of the main Hall and the spacious gallery above. Lit from within, the dioramas contain detailed and lifelike groups of large African mammals - game for the wealthy New York hunters who financed this experience... each diorama presents itself as a side altar, a stage, an unspoiled garden in nature, a hearth for home and family...

Above all, inviting the visitor to share its revelation, each tells the truth. Each offers a vision. Each is a window into knowledge. (Haraway 1989: 29)

Here, Haraway considers the relation established between elements in the room, and writes to convey the effect of their combination. She emphasizes the coherence of this Hall, both in its spatial organization and in its effects. Hetherington (1997), on the other hand, reminds us that museum and gallery spaces can also be incoherent. Particular objects can disrupt the symmetry or the clarity of the museum or gallery layout, for example.

Rooms can also be decorated in particular ways, with particular effects. In galleries of modern art, and also in galleries showing photography as art, the walls are often painted white and any seating is modern and minimal. This practice of display became common after the Second World War, and Duncan (1993) argues that it was encouraged by the insistence of the Museum of Modern Art in New York that that was how its big touring exhibition of postwar abstract expressionist American art should be shown. (Duncan places this exhibition in the context of US attempts to assert its cultural dominance in the Cold War.) The effects of this mode of display are suggested by Brian O'Doherty (1996: 321-2): 'the new god, extensive, homogeneous space, flowed easily into every part of the gallery. All impediments except "art" were removed ... the empty gallery [is] now full of that elastic space we call Mind'. O'Doherty is suggesting that the minimality of the white gallery space again produces the Art work as something to be contemplated separately from any other distractions; and again, it produces the visitor to such galleries as simply an eye unencumbered by considerations other than looking (see also Grunenberg 1999).

4.4 tactile technologies
One of the most important disciplines of museum and gallery spaces for visitors is the almost universal rule that you cannot touch the exhibits. This is enforced in a number of ways: objects are placed in glass cases, ropes are placed in front of paintings, warders watch visitors. Again, the Foucauldian question must be, what kind of subjectivities does this produce? Obviously, it produces a visitor that looks rather than touches (again).

4.5 spaces behind the displays
The rooms in which objects are displayed are of course only some of the spaces through which a museum's or a gallery's power/knowledge works. There are also the stores and the archives, the laboratornes and the libraries, the offices and service areas. As Hooper-Greenhill (1992: 7) notes, these spaces are not open to the public (although researchers can often gain access) because they
are the spaces in which the museums and galleries produce their knowledges. They are the spaces in which the museum professionals such as curators, restorers, designers and managers work; the spaces in which the classification schemes that structure the public display areas are put into practice. Hence:

a division is drawn ... between knowing subjects, between the producers and consumers of knowledge, between expert and layman ... In the public museum, the producing subject 'works' in the hidden spaces of the museum, while the consuming subject 'works' in the public spaces. Relations within the institution are skewed to privilege the hidden, productive 'work' of the museum, the production of knowledge through the compilation of catalogues, inventories and installations. (Hooper-Greenhill 1992: 190)

Yet very little attention is paid by Foucauldian studies of museums and galleries to these spaces and their particular technologies; indeed Bal (1996: 16) argues that the curators and other museum staff that work in these spaces are 'only a tiny connection in a long chain of subjects' and are therefore not worth studying in any detail. Bann (1998), however, demurs, and I too find this rather an odd omission. While writers like Bal (1996) and Hetherington (1997) are happy to explore the discursive contradictions of museums' and galleries' display spaces, they seem uninterested in the possibly more subversive contradictions at work in the behind-the-scenes practices that operationalize those institutions' regimes of truth. If, as Bann (1998: 239) argues, there are 'internal contradictions built into the development of the modern museum', they too require investigation, and might perhaps be best seen in these hidden spaces.

**Focus**

Few of these accounts of museums and galleries deal in any detail with what are now surely two more key spaces which visitors to these institutions encounter: the shop and the café. Visit the shop and café of your museum or gallery. What sorts of discourses are at work here? What sorts of practices? Are they connected to those of the display spaces? If so, how? If not, how not? Could you use the methods used by the discourse analysts in this chapter to examine the productivities of these spaces?

**5 the visitor**

Sections 3 and 4 have both noted that, according to these Foucauldian accounts of museums and galleries, as well as producing the images and objects in their possession in particular ways, these institutions also produce a certain sort of visitor. This visitor is perhaps above all constituted as an 'eye': someone who sees, and, through seeing, understands in specific ways. Museums do this explicitly, precisely offering their objects to their visitors as a kind of educational spectacle. According to Bennett (1995), things are slightly more complicated in the case of galleries, where the knowledge that produces the 'good eye' is kept invisible in order to maintain the gallery as a space where the middle class can distinguish itself from other social groups by displaying apparently innate 'taste'.

There are, though, more prosaic ways in which visitors to galleries and museums are disciplined. Section 4.4 noted some of these in relation to the prohibition on touching objects and images. There are many other rules about what visitors can and cannot do in galleries and museums, and these are enforced by warders. Picknicking and playing music, for example, are forbidden: the effect of this prohibition is to reiterate the 'higher', contemplative or pedagogic, aims of the institution. Other forms of discipline include the spatial routing of visitors. Often galleries and museums invite visitors to follow a particular route, either through the layout of rooms or through the provision of floor plans marked with suggested walks; this is very common for very large galleries that expect visitors with little time: routes are suggested which ensure that sort of visitor will see (what are constructed as) the highlights of the collection. Some galleries also give you a clue as to which paintings are especially deserving of this kind of viewing by providing seating in front of them. As section 3 of this chapter noted, Bal (1996) pays a lot of attention to the effects of this sort of spatial routing of visitors at the AMNH.

Bennett (1995) argues that there are other, less overt forms of disciplining behaviour in museums and galleries, though. From his historical work, he argues that the contemplation of art and the appreciation of museums' knowledge was expected to involve particular ways of visiting these places, and Bennett (1995) argues that these ways were policed not only by rules and warders but also by other visitors. That is, he reworks Foucault's discussion of the way surveillance makes the operation of power 'automatic' by suggesting that the regulation of social behaviour in these museums is conducted as much by the visitors' knowledge that they are being watched by other visitors, as it is by more obvious forms of discipline.

This emphasis on the productivity of the museum or gallery as an institution in relation to its visitors raises a key question though. Just how effective are these disciplining technologies? Chapter 7 noted that Foucault insisted that wherever there was power, there were counter-struggles, but a common criticism of Foucauldian methods is that they concentrate too much on the disciplining effects of institutions and not enough on the way these disciplines may fail or be disrupted. This is a criticism which can be made of all nearly all the accounts of museums and galleries cited in this chapter. The previous section remarked on their frequent uninterest in exploring the working practices
behind-the-scenes in museums and galleries, for example; it seems to be assumed that in those spaces, classifying systems and rhetorics of realism are successfully coherent, even by those writers who question its success in the more public spaces of these institutions. Similarly, few of these studies consider the possibility that visitors may be bringing knowledges and practices to the museum or gallery that are very different from those institutions' knowledges and practices. Bennett (1995: 11) is quite clear that this is not an issue his book is concerned to address:

My concern in this book is largely with museums, fairs and exhibitions as envisaged in the plans and projections of their advocates, designers, directors and managers. The degree to which such plans and projections were successful in organizing and framing the experience of the visitor, or, to the contrary, the degree to which such planned effects are evaded, side-stepped or simply not noticed raises different questions which, important though they are, I have not addressed here. (Bennett 1995: 11)

Hooper-Greenhill's (1994) book on Museums and Their Visitors focuses on recent attempts by museums and galleries to attract more visitors by increasing the relevance of their displays to potential visitors' lives (and suggests in passing that this involves the decentring of curatorial power), but says little about how visitors respond to their efforts. This neglect parallels the critique made by Smith (1998) of the Foucauldian histories of photography offered by Tagg (1988) and Sekula (1986, 1989). There too, the diversity of engagements with particular fields of power/knowledge is underestimated.

There are a few exceptions to this neglect of visitors as subjects constituted through discourses other than those of the museum or gallery. There are a number of case studies that have focused on exhibitions that have been especially controversial (see for example Lidchi 1997). Several recent exhibitions displaying the artefacts of native peoples, for example, have been heavily criticized for their continued naturalization or exoticization of those peoples, and Elsbeth Court (1999) discusses both this accusation and some artistic and curatorial responses to it in a case study of displays of art by a range of artists from Africa. However, much less attention has been paid to less organized forms of resistance to the museum and gallery's disciplines. One exception to this general neglect is the study by Gordon Fyfe and Max Ross (1996); they interviewed a range of people who visited museums in Stoke-on-Trent in England in order to explore the particularities of their ways of seeing. Their study invites more general questions about the visitors to museums and galleries. Do they critique the particularity of the sort of knowledge about Art offered by a gallery, for example? If so, how? Through their own experience? Through boredom? Through more formalized kinds of understanding, wondering why almost all the artists produced by galleries as great were men, or white? Do visitors touch objects on display, surreptitiously? Do they find routes around museums they shouldn't, or sneak a sandwich while a warden looks the other way? And what are the effects of these possible strategies on the visuality and spatiality of the museum and gallery, and on their paintings and objects? These sorts of questions are not made impossible by this second type of discourse analysis, but they have been pursued only very rarely. Hence none of these studies offers any methodological clues as to how such questions might be answered.

**Focus**

This section has noted the consequence of the emphasis in this second kind of discourse analysis on the institution rather than the visitors. What did your visit to a gallery or museum suggest about the power of the institution over its visitors? Did all the visitors you see behave 'properly'? If not, how not? Were there certain groups allowed to behave differently – children, for example? How were any deviations policed, if at all?

**6 discourse analysis II: an assessment**

This second type of discourse analysis follows Foucault in understanding visual images as embedded in the practices of institutions and their exercise of power. It thus pays less attention to visual images and objects themselves than to the institutional apparatus and technologies which surround them and which, according to this approach, produce them as particular kinds of images and objects. This approach is thus centrally concerned with the social production and effects of visual images, and that extent conforms to one of the criteria set out in Chapter 1 of this book for a critical visual methodology. It offers a methodology that allows detailed consideration of how the effects of dominant power relations work through the details of an institution's practice.

However, this type of discourse analysis pays little attention to the specific ways of seeing invited by an image itself (although it can focus with care on the context of its display). Nor, as sections 4.5 and 5 have noted, has it paid much attention to the way that 'power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations' (Foucault 1979: 94). Foucault's own arguments do not rule out this latter as a topic of research, but it has not so far been developed by these Foucauldian analysts.

Finally, there is the question of reflexivity. The kind of discourse analysis discussed in this chapter does not spend time on reflexive contemplation. This
is no doubt for the same reasons as section 5 of the previous chapter outlined: many of the assumptions underlying the conventional forms of reflexivity in the social sciences are not tenable within a Foucauldian framework. However, unlike the "certain modesty in our analytic claims" nonetheless advocated by Tonkiss (1998: 260) in her discussion of the first type of discourse analysis, discussed in section 5 of the previous chapter, this second type of discourse analysis tends, if anything, to the immodest. The introduction to this chapter noted as an example of this analytical self-confidence the stinging critique of Barthes made by Tagg (1988). But all the writers on museums and galleries cited in this chapter appear equally confident that the claims they make about the effects of these institutions are correct. Haraway's (1989) essay, for example, makes some highly coloured assertions about the effects of the AMNH's Akeley Hall that give me pause. Here's a taster of her style:

Scene after scene draws the visitor into itself through the eyes of the animals in the tableaux. Each diorama has at least one animal that catches the viewer's gaze and holds it in communion. The animal is vigilant...but ready also to hold forever the gaze of meeting, the moment of truth, the original encounter. The moment seems fragile, the animals about to disappear, the communion about to break; the Hall threatens to dissolve into the chaos of the Age of Man. But it does not. The gaze holds, and the wary animal heals those who will look. (Haraway 1989: 30)

While Haraway here may be attempting, in the Foucauldian manner advocated by Kendall and Wickham (1999: 101-9), to give co-authorship of her encounter with the Akeley Hall to its inanimate objects, she might also be read as offering an account of the effects of the Hall that is somewhat ungrounded in the details of its apparatus or technologies. (This critique has also been made of Luke's [2002] discussion of the AMNH [Rothenberg 2003].) Moreover, I suspect that this sort of writing makes the AMNH a lot more exciting—and powerful—than it is to the vast majority of its visitors.

Hence, this second form of discourse analysis focuses very clearly on the power relations at work in institutions of visual display. However, this focus produces some absences in its methodology too: an uninterest in images themselves, a lack of concern for conflicts and disruptions within institutional practices, a neglect of the practices of viewing brought by visitors to those institutions, and a lack of any form of reflexivity.

summary

- associated with: Discourse analysis II has most often been used to look at the ways in which various dominant institutions have put images to work.

- sites and modalities: This type of discourse analysis concentrates most on the sites of production and audiencing, in their social modality.

- key terms: Key terms include discourse, power/knowledge, surveillance, apparatus and technology.

- strengths and weaknesses: Discourse analysis II focuses on the articulation of discourses through institutional apparatuses and institutional technologies. It is especially effective at examining the powerful discourses that produce the objects and subject positions associated with various institutions, for example the objects that count as "art", the art gallery, and subjects such as patrons, curators and visitors. It is much less interested in the site of the image itself, and also in practice seems uninterested in the complexities and contradictions of discourse. Nor is discourse analysis II concerned with reflexive strategies.

Further reading
A recent collection of essays that showcases a range of critical studies of museums has been edited by Donald Preziosi and Clare Farago, entitled *Grasping the World: The Idea of the Museum* (2004). Henrietta Lidchi (1997) provides a detailed study of a particular museum exhibition that is carefully grounded in the details of the exhibition's apparatus and technologies, and also makes some connections with other methods of looking at museum and gallery spaces, while Mary Anne Staniszewski (1998) discusses the effects of different display practices at the Museum of Modern Art in New York from 1921 to 1970.